ChatGPT (open AI) proves the old garbage-in-garbage-out theory

I shuddered to think how CHATGPT would answer my question as to who was likely winning in Ukraine. But after reading their response, I realized it was worse than I thought.

I blame their response on the fact that they pretended that all Russian information is both scarce and propagandistic, thereby condemning themselves to the disinformation, obfuscation and lies of the western media.

I have long known that it is the Western news that is propagandistic, NOT so much the Russian news. I proved that by recording and posting as much as I could about Russian air strikes ever since Oct 2022 – in response to the ubiquitous western reports that Russia was running out of missiles. Instinct and long experience with Russophobia in the western press told me that this was a big lie and that the press, as a government tool, was just saying what the government wanted you to read. They were being good mushroom farmers, feeding you sh*t and keeping you in the dark.

Makes you wonder what they will tell us once the inevitable inflation from the Trump wrecking ball has destroyed what is left of world trade and inflation responds to the punitive tariffs on China, Canada, Mexico, EU and just about everyone else.

How do they convince a reader with a rumbling stomach and a shrinking belt size that he is well-fed and richer than ever thanks to Trump’s economic genius?

After what Trump did to the Palestinian children, what would we expect?

Here is my conversation with ChatGPT. The text in bold, caps and [brackets] is mine, all of which I sent back to ChatGPT.

Chatgpt.com, according to your available information, which side in the Ukraine conflict can reasonably be expected to win the war and why?

Short answer — no clear, certain “winner”

[After reading their biased short answer, I wrote back and asked for the long answer. I then added my notes to the AI response and sent it back, as follows]

Nice — thanks for the nudge. Here’s a long, sourced, analytical answer about which side can “reasonably be expected to win” the war in Ukraine, why that conclusion follows, and the maI in uncertainties and scenarios to watch.

[FIRST OFF, I NOTE THAT ALL YOUR SOURCES ARE WESTERN, ARE YOU PROGRAMMED TO SHUN RUSSIAN-LANGAGE SITES? DOESN’T THE AVOIDANCE OF RUSSIAN SITES INTRODUCE A SELECTION FACTOR? I READ RUSSIAN FLUENTLY SO YOU MAY QUOTE FROM RF INFO AND COMPLEMENT WHAT YOU HAVE WRITTEN. I READ TSARGRAD AND RIA NOVOSTI AND OTHERS. STATEMENTS FROM THE RF MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ARE WELCOME. MAY I POINT OUT THAT THE WESTERN NEWS IS INFLUENCED BY A STRONG INTEREST IN PROMULGATING DETAILSSHOWING THAT UKRAINE HAS CHANCES OF WINNING BASED ON THE DESIRE [FUELED BY ARMS LOBBIES] TO SEND WEAPONS AND MONEY. RUSSIA HAS NO SUCH INTEREST SINCE ALL ITS WEAPONS ARE MADE AT HOME OR PURCHASED, NONE ARE DONATED. NEWS MEDIA IN THE WEST HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN UKRAINE WINNING AND THAT DEPENDS ON DONATIONS OR LEND-LEASE PROGRAMS. REMEMBER THAT THE MEDIA STOOD LIKE A PHALANX BEHIND THE NOW DISPROVEN GOVERNMENT NARRATIVE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, WAS DEVELOPING NUKES, WAS SUPPORTING AL-QAEDA, ETC. DO YOU REALLY TRUST THE “REPUTABLE” SOURCES THAT BACKED THESE FALSE NARRATIVES? BY CONTRAST, RUSSIA HAS NO HISTORY OF MAKING WAR BASED ON FALSE INFO. ALSO, LET ME SHARE A STORY FROM THE RUSSIAN PRESS. A FEW YEARS AGO, KIEV REPORTED THAT IT HAD SHOT DOWN X NUMBER OF RUSSIAN HYPERSONICS. ESSENTIALLY, HYPERSONICS CANNOT BE SHOT DOWN BUT THERE ARE BOGUS REPORTS THAT THEY ARE INTERCEPTED. THE NEXT DAY THE RUSSIAN MOD SAID IT HAD ACTUALLY FIRED ONLY Y NUMBER OF MISSILES ON THAT DATE, WHICH WAS 2 LESS THAN NUMBER REPORTED BY KIEV. DESPITE THIS OBVIOUS DISINFORMATION, WESTERN NEWS MEDIA CONTINUE TO PUBLISH WAR INFORMATION ALMOST SOLELY FROM UKRAINIAN SOURCES. SO PLEASE STOP QUOTING ONLY WESTERN SOURCES.

Short takeaway (one line)

At present (August 2025) no side appears able to force a quick, decisive, unconditional victory — the war looks set to remain a contest of attrition and diplomacy where the most likely near-to-medium term outcomes are negotiated settlements, frozen fronts, or incremental territorial shifts rather than a clear-cut military knockout for either Russia or Ukraine. Institute for the Study of WarInstitute for the Study of War [WESTERN]

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1) Where things stand now (what the sources say)

• Territorial control and fighting: Russia still holds significant occupied territory (roughly ~20% of Ukraine), including all of Luhansk, most of Donetsk, large parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia [RECENT REPORTS SAY THE RF IS ACTUALLY ENTERING BOTH PLACES], plus other pockets; fighting continues along multiple fronts with localized Russian advances in summer 2025 (e.g., around Donetsk/Pokrovsk) and Ukrainian counterattacks in other sectors. The Washington PostReuters [ARE ANY OF THE UKRAINIAN COUNTERATTACKS SUCCESSFUL?]
  
  

• Operational assessments: The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and allied open-source analysts report steady Russian pressure and offensive activity in some sectors while Ukrainian forces conduct counterattacks and localized advances in others; ISW warns Russia could violate ceasefires and will likely press to turn battlefield gains into political leverage. [IS IT OBJECTIVE REPORTING TO WARN THAT A COUNTRY COULD VIOLATE A HYPOTHETICAL CEASEFIRE? ALSO, AS FAR AS I KNOW, RUSSIA HAS NO CURRENTLY VALID CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS. SO WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SPECULATION, WHICH DOES NOT BEAR ON MY QUESTION?] Institute for the Study of WarInstitute for the Study of War
  
  

• Munitions and industrial capacity: Western suppliers have been essential to Ukraine’s defense, but Western munitions stockpile concerns and temporary halts to some shipments (e.g., some precision munitions/air-defense items) have appeared in 2025 reporting — an important constraint for Kyiv’s operational reach. At the same time, Russia has ramped up drone/missile production and is leveraging external partners to replenish strike inventories. politico.comInstitute for the Study of War. [YES BUT EVEN WHEN THE EU AND US WERE BOTH SENDING AS MUCH AS THEY COULD, WHAT WAS THE APPROX. RATIO OF WESTERN-SUPPLIED AND UKRAINIAN MADE ARMS AND AMMO TO RUSSIAN ARMS AND AMMO USED IN THE CONFLICT? To the reader: It has always hovered around 3 to 1 in favor of Russia. ChatGPT is just cheerleading for Ukraine]
  
  

(These five points above are the core facts that underpin the rest of the analysis.) Institute for the Study of War+1politico.com

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2) Why neither side is set up for a fast decisive victory

Below are the causal chains that make a quick, total victory unlikely in the near term. [OK, BUT WHY IS UKRAINE – AND NOT RUSSIA – PLEADING FOR A CEASEFIRE: DOES THE SIDE THAT IS CONFIDENT IT IS WINNING ASK FOR A CEASEFIRE?]

A. Logistics, industry, and munitions production are decisive.

• Modern high-intensity combat depends on massive, steady flows of artillery shells, missiles, drones and spare parts. Ukraine remains dependent on Western production and deliveries; if donors pause or slow (for political or inventory reasons) Ukraine’s tempo suffers. Conversely, Russia’s heavy reliance on mobilization and partner supplies limits the qualitative edge of its forces even when it has numerical mass [YOUR ANSWER IS HEAVILY WEIGHTED IN FAVOR OF UKRAINE: UKRAINE IS ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON PARTNER SUPPLIES AND THESE ARE FOR NOW EITHER DONATED OR LENT, WHEREAS RUSSIA’S SUPPLIES ARE ALMOST ALL HOME MADE OR PURCHASED, AND THE SUPPLIER IS NOT KNOWN TO BE EXTENDING CREDIT] . RAND [RAND PROFITS GREATLY FROM THIS WAR AND ITS REPORTING COULD BE SWAYED BY THE FACT. IF THE WAR ENDS, ITS PROFITS DROP DRASTICALLY. HOW CAN IT BE CONSIDERED A RELIABLE SOURCE? YOU CAN QUOTE IT BUT AT LEAST POINT THAT OUT] and reporting on western stock worries highlight this centrality [THIS MIGHT BE A SIGNIFICANT CENTRALITY IF WESTERN STOCK HAD EVER ALLOWED UKRAINE TO DEFEND ITS TERRITORY, BUT DID RUSSIA NOT MAKE CONSIDERABLE TERRITORIAL GAINS BACK WHEN ALL SOURCES IN US AND EUROPE WERE SUPPLYING SIGNIFICANT AMMO AND ARMS?]. RAND Corporationpolitico.com
  
  

B. Manpower and quality.

• Russia can mobilize personnel but faces issues of training, cohesion, and political limits on how many and how effectively it can sustain losses. Ukraine’s manpower is smaller but highly motivated, better trained in many units [WHAT UNITS ARE “BETTER TRAINED” THAN RUSSIAN UNITS?, and increasingly professionalized with Western training [THIS PASSAGE SUGGESTS THAT WESTERN TRAINING IS SUPERIOR TO RUSSIAN TRAINING. IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE OF THIS? THE UKRAINIANS OFTEN USE THE TERM “BUSSIFIED”. DO YOU KNOW WHAT THIS MEANS? HOW ABOUT THE RUSSIAN WORD ‘MOGILIZATSIA” AS APPLIED TO THE UKRAINIAN METHOD OF “RECRUITING?”] Mass alone is not decisive without logistics, command, and sustainment. jamestown.orgRAND Corporation [JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION IS SUPPOSEDLY NON-PARTISAN BUT SINCE BOTH RAND AND JAMESTOWN ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORT WAR, THAT MEANS NOTHING. https://www.voltairenet.org/article30194.html]
  
  

C. Geography, fortifications, and attrition.

• Defenders good at combined arms and with modern air defense can inflict heavy costs on attackers. Once frontlines become trench-like and deeply fortified, breakthroughs become exponentially harder and casualties rise fast — favoring the side that can sustain supplies and political will. ISW’s running battlefield assessments show a patchwork of local gains and losses rather than a single collapsing front. Institute for the Study of War [THAT STATEMENT DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE NET GAINS OF EITHER SIDE AND IN FACT CLOUDS THE REALITY. RUSSIA’S KINZHAL MISSILE HAS BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN BREAKING THROUGH THE MOST RESISTENT BUNKERS, EVEN FAR UNDERGROUND]
  
  

D. Political and diplomatic constraints.

• International politics (donor fatigue, election cycles, diplomatic maneuvers) can change the balance faster than armies. Negotiations or a ceasefire imposed or incentivized by outside powers could freeze gains without total victory for either side. Recent high-level diplomacy (including U.S. envoy visits and proposals) underscores this. [BUT WHY NOT AT LEAST MENTION THAT, BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE –EG, THE MINSK AGREEMENTS AND SUBSEQUENT CONFESSIONS OF SUBTERFUGE FROM MERKEL, HOLLANDE AND POROSHENKO – RUSSIAN POLICY ABSOLUTELY FORBIDS ACCEPTNG A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT?] theguardian.comThe Washington Post
  
  

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3) The six factors that will most determine which side fares better going forward

1. Western ammunition and heavy-weapon production & delivery rates. (If Western production scales up and political support stays steady, Ukraine’s offense capability improves; supply pauses weaken it.) [AS I MENTIONED ABOVE, RUSSIA WAS ADVANCING EVEN WITH MAXIMUM WESTERN ARMS SUPPLIES. FURTHER, IT IS USELESS TO SPEAK OF WESTERN PRODUCTION INCREASING BECAUSE BOTH EUROPE AND THE US ARE GOING BROKE WITH THE LACK OF RUSSIAN GAS IN THE FORMER AND A RUNAWAY DEBT PROBLEM IN THE LATTER, WHICH IS KILLING US CREDIT, WITH LENDERS TURNING AWAY] politico.com
   

2. Russian missile/drone production and sanctions-circumvention. (Russia’s increased drone/missile output in 2025 changes the strike calculus and attrition dynamics.) [YES, BUT THE NUMBER OF RUSSIAN STRIKES ALWAYS FAR EXCEEDED THAT OF KIEV. AND KIEV HAD NO HYPERSONICS AND NO WAY OF INTERCEPTING RUSSIAN HYPERSONICS] \Institute for the Study of War N
   
   

3. Effective mobilization and troop quality (especially Russia’s contracted forces vs. professional Ukrainian units). jamestown.org [YOU’VE GOT THAT EXACTLY BACKWARDS. ONLY RECENTLY HAS RUSSIA STARTED TO USE N KOREAN CONTRACTORS, WHEREAS KIEV HAS USED POORLY TRAINED FOREIGN TROOPS SINCE THE START OF HOSTILITIES]
   
   

4. Information dominance, domestic political will, and morale on both sides. (Sustained public support or political instability changes endurance.) RAND Corporation
   

5. Operational breakthroughs vs. stalemate economics. (A single credible operational breakthrough — e.g., cutting Russian logistics in a major sector — could open windows for strategic change. [THE AUTHOR OF THIS IS CLEARLY BIASED. THE RUSSIANS ARE CONSTANTLY DESTROYING UKRAINIAN LOGISTICS, SUCH AS RR JUNCTIONS, RR STATIONS, SUPPLY SHIPS W WESTERN SUPPLIES IN ODESSA, BRIDGES – JUST LAST WEEK AN IMPORTANT ONE. RUSSIA ALSO ROUTINELY ENCIRCLES TROOPS TO PREVENT SUPPLIES FROM REACHING THEM]) Institute for the Study of War
   
   

6. Diplomatic deals and third-party pressure (including big-power meetings). (Diplomacy can convert position into political outcomes faster than a grinding war. [IN RECENT YEARS TRUMP HAS EXCLUDED EUROPE AND THE UKRAINIANS FROM THE MAIN NEGOTIATIONS. ANOTHER OBSTACLE IS THE FACT THAT ZELENSKY’S PRESIDENTIAL TERM EXPIRED MANY MONTHS AGO AND KIEV HAS NO LEGITIMATE LEADER TO NEGOTIATE WITH. PUTIN REMINDS US THAT ZELENSKI COULD NOT LEGITIMATELY SIGN A PEACE TREATY. I DON’T UNDERSTAND WHY ALL THESE IMPORTANT DETAILS ARE BEING IGNORED. I SUSPECT THAT YOUR SOURCES ARE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. WHY PRETEND THE RUSSIAN MEDIA DON’T EXIST?) The Washington Post
   

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4) Probable scenarios (with rough qualitative likelihoods)

These are not precise probabilities but a ranked set of plausible futures to watch for.

1. Protracted war / frozen front with periodic local fighting (Most likely, ~40–55% [AS FAR AS I KNOW, RUSSIA HAS NEVER SHOWN ANY SIGNS OF ONLY PERIODICALLY FIGHTING]): both sides hold much of what they can sustain; conflict grinds on with incremental gains and losses [BUT ARE THERE ANY GAINS ON THE KIEV SIDE]; international aid continues but unevenly. This preserves instability and periodic diplomatic jockeying. Institute for the Study of WarInstitute for the Study of War
   
   

2. Negotiated settlement that locks in large Russian territorial gains (Plausible, ~20–30%): if diplomatic pressure (or donor fatigue/political changes in the West) leads Kyiv to accept a ceasefire [YOUR SOURCES ARE ABSOLUTELY CLUELESS! RUSSIA WILL NEVER AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE. IT BELIEVES CEASEFIRES ARE OFFERED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF GIVING UKRAINE AND THE WEST A CHANCE TO REARM. THIS IS WHY YOU ARE LAGGING IN YOUR REPORTING. YOU ARE UNACCEPTABLY ESCHEWING RUSSIAN SOURCES. YEARS AGO, RUSSIA EXPLAINED WHY IT CAN’T TRUST WESTERN-BROKERED CEASEFIRES. YOUR RESPONSE SHOWS THAT IF WESTERN SOURCES COULD BE FREED FROM POLITICAL BIAS, HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES COULD HAVE BEEN SAVED BY ENDING THE FIGHTING YEARS AGO!], Russia could consolidate control over some oblasts. ISW warns any ceasefire without robust guarantees risks renewed aggression. [THE CONFESSIONS OF SUBTERFUGE IN THE MINSK ACCORDS BY MERKEL, HOLLANDE AND POROSHENKO PROVE THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A “ROBUST” WESTERN GUARANTEE, AND THEREFORE, RUSSIA WILL NEVER ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE] Institute for the Study of WarThe Washington Post
   

3. Ukrainian operational reversal and limited reconquest (Plausible but conditional, ~15–25%): with sustained high levels of Western aid, improved artillery/missile supply and selective breakthroughs, Ukraine could push Russian forces back in several sectors over months to a year. This requires large, consistent shipments and munition production. [SO FAR THERE IS NOT NEARLY AS MUCH PRODUCTION CAPACITY IN THE WEST AS IN RUSSIA. THIS IS PURE FANTASY TO MAKE IT LOOK LIKE UKRAINE HAS A CHANCE. POLITICIANS AND ARMS LOBBYISTS ARE KILLING PEOPLE WITH PROPAGANDA FOR THE SAKE OF PROFIT] ] politico.comRAND Corporation
   
   

4. Russian strategic success (less likely short-term [UNTRUE. RUSSIA IS NOW STOPPING ALL COUNTERATTACKS ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND ALSO DESTROYING KIEV’S ARMS PRODUCTION PLANTS WITH ITS MISSILES AND DRONES, – ALMOST ALL ARMS PRODUCTION IS GONE!], possible long-term if Russia massively scales mobilization and production, ~10–20%): if Russia manages high-quality mobilization, massive munitions production, and sustained offensives while Western aid wanes, Moscow could produce more decisive breakthroughs over time. Current open-source assessments find this harder than it looks because of quality and logistic limits [ONLY HIGHLY BIASED WESTERN SOURCES THINK THIS IS HARD] jamestown.orgInstitute for the Study of War
   
   

5. Rapid escalation or external intervention (low but high-impact): a surprise that draws NATO directly or a large new third-party intervention could produce an outsized outcome — low probability but catastrophic if it happens. (I list it only because such events would change everything. [WOULD THEY? HOW? RUSSIA IS A NUCLEAR POWER]) Institute for the Study of War
   
   

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5) How analysts and governments use this reasoning in practice

• Governments monitor the six factors above (especially ammunition pipeline and political signals) to decide how much and how fast to supply Ukraine. Analysts use daily OSINT (satellite photos, geolocated footage, casualty and logistics reporting) to judge whether local offensives are transient or strategic. ISW’s daily updates are a good running indicator of whether one side is gaining operational momentum. Institute for the Study of War+1
  
  

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6) What to watch next (concrete, dateable signals)

• Major new aid packages announced by the US/EU (size and delivery timeline [EUROPE AND THE US ARE RUNNING ON FUMES. OVEREXTENDD ALREADY) — these change Ukraine’s near-term odds. politico.com
  
  

• Significant increases in Russian production figures or confirmed large stockpiles of missile/drone types (ISW reporting on production is important). Institute for the Study of War
  
  

• Clear, sustained operational breakthroughs (verified geolocated footage of major cities/rail hubs falling or being cut). Reuters/ISW geolocated reporting is a good source. ReutersInstitute for the Study of War
  
  

• High-level diplomacy outcomes (e.g., any publicly verifiable ceasefire text or agreements from big-power talks). Recent envoy visits and proposed meetings are exactly the sort of signal to monitor. theguardian.comThe Washington Post
  
  

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7) Final assessment (concise)

Given the balance of munitions/industrial capacity, continuing external support for Ukraine, Russia’s ability to produce more missiles/drones, and political dynamics, the most reasonable expectation is a continued, hard, attritional conflict with no guaranteed, rapid “winner.” Over the next 6–18 months outcomes will hinge mainly on Western aid continuity and any political/diplomatic breakthroughs. politico.comInstitute for the Study of WarInstitute for the Study of War

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Спросить ChatGPT

I sent all of my questions and comments in the above form to ChatGPT and here is a sampling of their response to my feedback–along with my comments, which I did not bother to send them. They’re for your use only:

Yes, many publicly available analyses tend to rely heavily on Western open sources like ISW, Jamestown, and Western media. This is partly because independent, verifiable Russian military data is scarce or propagandistic by nature

Me: BS. I had already explained, with examples, why the US is the side that excels in propaganda, but Chat just ignored all of what I said.

Chat: Your point about vested interests—Western media promoting Ukraine’s chances, arms manufacturers profiting from the conflict, and Western political agendas—is well taken. Russian media and official channels have their own state-driven narratives and strategic messaging too, often denying setbacks or overstating successes.

Me: I gave examples. They didn’t deign to do likewise.

Chat: Your note about Russian use of hypersonic weapons (e.g., Kinzhal missiles) being very effective against fortifications is consistent with some open Russian claims. Western sources tend to downplay or question such claims due to lack of independent verification.

Me: Notice how Chat – like all Western info sources, arbitrarily telegraphs that only the West can provide “independent verification.” All Russian sources supposedly lack that. They make it up as they go.

You asked about the relative training quality and the meaning of terms like “bussified” (a derogatory Ukrainian term implying foreign mercenaries or troops are “ferried” in without enough cohesion) and “mogilizatsia” (Russian term roughly meaning “burial” or heavy losses, implying Ukraine’s manpower losses due to aggressive recruitment or conscription). These terms reflect deep social and military tensions on both sides.

Me: I was just testing. I knew what bussification meant and their definition was pure fantasy. The Russian equivalent of Bussification refers to the fact that men are kidnapped off the street in Ukraine and put on busses and sent to be front with little or no training. Mogilificatsia comes from mogila, meaning tomb. It is a play on the word mobilizatsia, meaning to mobilize.

Chat: Western analysts often praise Ukrainian troops’ motivation

Me: Of course the WEST pretends the poor Ukies are highly motivated, but this is a LIE. They hate their govt. And hate being scooped off the streets to die at the front.

Chat also has to admit: Russia’s domestic arms production, though sanctioned and under pressure, remains substantial, with added help from countries willing to supply parts or materials discreetly.
Your question about the actual ratio of Western-supplied to Russian-made arms in use is complex; open data is limited [NO, open data is all over the Russian media, but these lackeys are obliged to keep pretending all Russian news is questionable – implying that the

West is the one telling the truth], but it’s likely Russia still has greater production capacity overall, especially given Ukraine’s reliance on intermittent shipments.

Chat: Zelensky’s legitimacy and term expiry is indeed a factor in diplomatic talks; Putin has highlighted this to question the validity of any agreement signed by Kyiv.

Chat: The most likely scenario remains a prolonged war of attrition, with neither side able to deliver a decisive knockout.

Sour grapes. The recent uptick in massive strikes has taken out enormous amounts of Kieve’s military industrial output. It is hard to imagine how the Ukes can continue. Yesterday I reported on massive surrenders, And now with Ze begging for a ceasefire, it is obvious he is up against a wall. How can they keep pretending?

There was a LOT more nonsense like this and you can see which way the wind blows. I could almost imagine Ze signing a surrender and the West burying the news. Almost.

**

Air strike update for 8-19, 2025

Translation with my notes in bold and in [brackets]

https://www.1tv.ru/news/2025-08-10/517615-armiya_rf_nanesla_novye_massirovannye_udary_po_ukrainskim_voennym_ob_ektam

August 10, 2025, 12:01

The Russian army launched new massive strikes on Ukrainian military facilities

Tonight, explosions thundered at military facilities in Ukraine. Arrivals in Sinelnikovo, in the Dnipropetrovsk region, presumably by "Gerans". There is a strong fire at the site. Another target of the Russian military is the railway station in Vasylkivka.

In addition, there are reports of explosions in the Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Poltava oblasts and in the part of the Zaporizhia oblast controlled by the Kyiv regime. Arrivals also in the Sumy region, where Russian troops are creating a security zone. The task is to disrupt the work of enemy air defense forces. An anti-aircraft missile system was destroyed.

Krasnoarmeysk [Pokrovsk] area, attack aircraft are advancing there. A real hunt for equipment that delivers ammunition to positions. And in the South Donetsk direction, drone operators shot down an American M-113 armored personnel carrier. A powerful explosion - and instead of a car there is a pile of metal.