The hidden calamity – the new execution law in Israel

This is one of those things that is spoken about openly on both but it hides a great calamity.

May 06, 2026

There is no one there to stop Israel and no one ever needed stopping more urgently.

The new execution law enables them to kill more people.

All those who think Israel needs a new law to kill more Palestinians, raise your hand.

They’ve murdered 71,000 so far, and that’s only in Gaza. And they’ve killed essentially all the journalists and medical doctors who have tried to treat children. It is now official-unofficial policy to treat doctors they don’t like as criminals. Now the West Bank is under attack and that’s only Israel. They’re killing mercilessly in Lebanon, including Christians. And that’s because they have hillbilly Mike Huckabee providing cover for them.

That is because Trump is their enforcer.

Mike is supposedly Christian, but he sees thing through a Judaic prism because he’s a “Christian” Zionist and they’re more Jewish than Christian.

Read our translation of an Alkhanadeq article about the new “legal” means of killing in Israel. If the press in America were honest they’d admit they’re Nazis to the core.

But the new press in America is Israeli owned. Well, not technically. The government is not involved but actually, the government doesn’t need to be involved because the people who own the US press are convinced Zionists.

That’s very bad for America.

We clearly do not have a government and we don’t have a free press.

Our only hope, and I am not exaggerating in the least, is IRAN because the Gulf Arabs and others are sold out. Each is thinking of his own ill-gotten gain.

But that is changing. If there is another war, the fortunes of these uber-rich sheikhs will be hit hard

https://edition.cnn.com/2026/05/03/middleeast/hezbollah-fiber-optic-drones-israel-intl-cmd

Hezbollah deploys a potent new weapon designed to evade Israeli detection

Charbel Mallo, Tal Shalev. Oren Liebermann

May 2, 2026

Hezbollah uses a weapon designed by in the Ukraine war that is tethered to a fiberoptic cable to avoid detection. Old fashioned drones were operated by radio signals which gave away the operator’s location, putting in danger.

In the new system, one can sneak up on the enemy undetected.

“Operation Freedom” Fails its First Test… and Tehran Imposes a Deterrent Equation

[It wasn’t about freedom. It was about hegemony – the old unipolar world. And it was dying]

Trump and the Strait of Hormuz

What was dubbed “Operation Freedom” was merely the latest expression of a deeper American predicament, one that transcends the tactic of opening a maritime passage and extends to the very ability to reassert hegemony in an international environment whose rules have changed. The issue was never technical, nor simply a military operation to escort stranded ships; rather, it was a direct test of Washington’s ability to translate its military superiority into a stable political reality. This test failed with remarkable speed.

From the outset, the project appeared more like a declaration of intent than a viable plan. The American administration, which began its escalation with limited military options, quickly encountered the limitations of hard power in an environment saturated with deterrent balances. As it shifted to economic pressure tactics and then attempted to impose a new maritime reality in the Strait of Hormuz, it was moving in a compensatory rather than an offensive direction. “Operation Freedom” was not the beginning of a new phase, but rather the culmination of the failures of previous phases.

From Initiative to Rapid Retreat

The announcement of the project was laden with both humanitarian and political rhetoric, as Donald Trump presented it as a step aimed at “freeing ships” and assisting neutral countries. However, this very framing revealed the project’s fragility: the power that had managed the global maritime order for decades was now forced to justify its intervention under a humanitarian, rather than a sovereign, pretext.

Within a mere 48 hours, this project became a subject of retreat. The suspension of the operation, coinciding with the shift in American discourse to characterizing the situation as “defensive,” was not merely a tactical adjustment, but a tacit admission of the inability to impose a new equation in the Strait. Most significant was linking the suspension to a negotiating process and to “requests from other countries,” reflecting that the decision was no longer purely American, as it once was.

This rapid retreat reveals a fundamental truth: Washington is no longer operating in a strategic vacuum, but rather within a complex web of pressures, from Congress domestically to regional powers abroad, and finally to an adversary—Iran—that has proven its ability to transform any American move into an open-ended war of attrition.

Iran and the Redefinition of Control

In contrast, Tehran did not treat the “Freedom Project” as a marginal event, but rather as an opportunity to reassert its control. Its announcement of a new mechanism for managing ship traffic was not merely a regulatory measure, but a distinctly sovereign act, effectively shifting the center of decision-making in the Strait from international equilibrium to direct Iranian oversight.

This move carries two fundamental implications. First, Iran is no longer content with a policy of deterrence, but has moved to a stage of imposing rules. Second, any attempt to open the Strait without coordination with it is now considered a violation warranting a response.

While Washington spoke of “escorting ships,” Tehran was redefining the very concept of passage, from an international right to an operation subject to its conditions. It is precisely here that the depth of the shift becomes apparent: the conflict is no longer about passage through the Strait, but about who possesses the legitimacy to regulate it.

Tehran did not stop there, but went further, translating this shift into direct practical measures by establishing a detailed mechanism for managing traffic in the Strait. This mechanism requires commercial vessels to coordinate in advance with the Iranian military and obtain permission to pass through predetermined routes. This mechanism, accompanied by new navigational charts and a de facto expansion of the control zone, reflects not merely a technical regulation of maritime traffic, but rather establishes a different legal and sovereign reality, transforming freedom of passage from an open international principle into a privilege contingent upon Iranian approval. More importantly, the introduction of modern procedural tools, such as notifying ships of rules through direct channels, indicates an attempt to institutionalize this shift, making it sustainable rather than a temporary measure tied to the crisis.

The Limits of American Power

What this scenario reveals is the growing gap between American military power and its ability to achieve political objectives. Even with its clear naval superiority, Washington has failed to secure a safe environment for navigation without sliding into open confrontation.

Reports describing the project as a “risky adventure” were not exaggerated. Through a combination of missiles, drones, and fast attack craft, Iran has succeeded in turning the Strait into a high-cost zone for any hostile military presence. This type of asymmetric threat undermines the effectiveness of conventional power and makes any large-scale intervention a reckless gamble.

More dangerously, even a partial success of the operation would not have restored the situation to its previous state. Shipping traffic, which had reached approximately 130 vessels daily, plummeted to near zero daily, not only due to the immediate threat but also as a result of the loss of confidence. In the world of markets, confidence is not imposed by warships but by stability, and this is precisely what Washington failed to provide.

The Economy as a Mirror of Failure

The repercussions of this failure were not confined to the battlefield but extended to global markets. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz was not merely a geopolitical event but an unprecedented energy shock that reshaped supply and demand expectations and drove prices to volatile levels.

Markets that had been banking on a swift American intervention to restore the flow of supplies found themselves facing a different reality: a declining superpower, a strait subject to new rules, and an open-ended conflict with no clear end in sight. This combination created a state of uncertainty, the most dangerous of all, because it is measured not only by direct losses but also by the erosion of predictability.

From Hegemony to Crisis Management

At its core, “Operation Freedom” reflects a structural shift in the American role. Instead of setting the rules, Washington now seeks to manage them. Instead of imposing them, it now negotiates them. This shift does not signify the end of American power, but it clearly indicates a decline in its ability to wield it in the way that prevailed in past decades.

What happened in the Strait of Hormuz is a microcosm of this shift: a project announced confidently, quickly suspended, and replaced by a defensive rhetoric, in contrast to an adversary that fills the void and redefines the rules of the game.

Ultimately, “Operation Freedom” did not fail because it was not fully implemented, but because it lacked the conditions for success from the outset. It was a project born in a hostile strategic environment, without sufficient domestic mandate, without the capacity to bear the cost of escalation, and without a clear vision for the post-implementation period. In this sense, the suspension was not the end of the project, but rather the moment its true nature was revealed: an initiative that attempted to appear as a solution, but was in reality an expression of the crisis.

In a world where sea lanes are becoming open battlegrounds, the question is no longer: How will Washington open the straits? But rather: Does it still have the power to force them to open at all?

Author: Editorial Staff

https://alkhanadeq.com/post/10732/ترامب-لا-ينهي-الحروب-بل-يجمدها-حتى-تنضج

Monday, May 4, 2026, 8:51 AM

Trump Doesn’t End Wars… He Freezes Them Until They Mature

Trump, Congress, and Iranian Missiles

To put it bluntly: What Trump did wasn’t declare the end of a war, but rather redefine it in a way that buys him time, reduces his constraints, and keeps his adversary under constant pressure without the cost of a major escalation.

On the surface, everything seems logical. An official letter to Congress states that “hostilities have ended.” No firing for weeks. No intention to seek new authorization. It’s as if the US administration is turning the page and preparing to move on to another issue.

But the reality… is quite different.

What actually happened was a clever—and perhaps ruthless—use of legal loopholes. The sixty-day deadline expired, so Trump chose to end the “war” on paper, not on the ground. With this move, he removed the pretext from Congress and escaped domestic pressure without actually binding himself. No one can stop him politically now, and at the same time, he is no longer obligated to justify every military action he might take later under the guise of an “ongoing war.”

In simpler terms: the file is closed… so that all options are open.

Here, the true picture begins to emerge.

Instead of missiles launched daily, there is a naval blockade. Instead of an open battle, there is a slow strangulation. Trump doesn’t hide this approach; rather, he declares it clearly when he says, “Time is on our side.” This statement, in particular, reveals the essence of the approach: it is not a war of swift resolution, but a long war of attrition.

The idea is to gradually push Iran into a corner—economically, militarily, and psychologically. No knockout blow, but continuous attrition. This type of pressure doesn’t generate headlines every day, but it accumulates a heavy impact over time.

But the problem is that this model of conflict doesn’t remain stable for long.

Because you are essentially creating a gray area: no clear war that can be contained, and no peace upon which to build. A state of limbo, where each side tests the other’s limits, and every minor incident carries the potential for escalation. The Gulf, in particular, cannot tolerate this kind of fragile balance, because any friction in a waterway or miscalculation could ignite a conflagration.

This is precisely where Trump sets his equation: I will not initiate hostilities, but I will continue to apply pressure. If Iran accepts this, the situation will continue. If it refuses and decides to break it, then it will bear the responsibility for the escalation.

This is not just a message, but a political trap. Because acceptance means living with an open-ended siege, and refusal means risking a war for which Tehran may not be ready at present.

But… is Washington itself ready?

Information emerging from within the military establishment suggests something different. Stockpiles of precision munitions are rapidly dwindling. The last war, along with other commitments, has depleted a significant portion of combat capabilities. Some assessments within American think tanks speak plainly: in the event of a large-scale confrontation with a major power, gaps may appear within weeks, not months.

Most importantly, plans to compensate for these gaps are not immediate. Yes, there are projects to significantly increase military production, but implementation requires time and funding. Funding, in particular, is not guaranteed, given the divisions within Congress and hearings that revealed clear tensions between the Department of Defense and lawmakers.

Even the defense companies themselves don’t seem to be in a hurry. They are waiting for guaranteed funding before expanding their production. This means that the “industrial power” that Washington is banking on remains, so far, more of a promise than a tangible reality.

Herein lies the paradox.

Trump chooses sanctions because they are effective… yes. But he also chooses them because they are less costly at a time when the United States doesn’t seem ready for a long, open-ended war. That is to say, the strategy is not only offensive but also defensive, even if this isn’t explicitly stated.

Conversely, Iran doesn’t appear to be in a position to surrender. The responses received through mediation channels haven’t convinced Washington, and the gap between the two sides is widening rather than narrowing. In fact, what has leaked through Iranian media channels reveals that Tehran is not merely proposing a de-escalation, but rather a comprehensive set of conditions reflecting a completely opposite approach: clear guarantees against any future aggression, the withdrawal of US forces from its vicinity, the release of frozen assets, the lifting of sanctions and compensation, the end of the naval blockade, and a restructuring of the navigation regime in the Strait of Hormuz… culminating in a broader proposal for “peace everywhere,” including Lebanon.

This proposal, if read calmly, does not appear to be a compromise offer so much as an attempt to completely redraw the rules of engagement. Iran is not saying “let’s de-escalate,” but rather: “Change the environment you are putting me in.”

And this is precisely where the gap widens.

Because what Washington wants is a change in behavior within the existing system, while what Tehran is proposing is a change to the system itself. The difference between the two is not technical, but fundamental. This explains why the negotiations appear to be moving forward… without actually approaching any point of convergence.

And here the picture becomes even more complex.

Because conflicts managed in this way—pressure without explosion, deterrence without settlement—tend to persist… until a sudden break occurs. This doesn’t necessarily have to be a major strategic decision, but sometimes a small incident, a miscalculation, or even a different interpretation of a field operation.

The question that arises is: How long can this situation continue before it spirals out of control?

Trump is betting on time. On the pressure eventually leading to concessions. On Iran not risking a full-blown confrontation. But historically, this bet is not guaranteed. Countries living under constant pressure don’t remain indefinitely in a reactive position. At some point, the calculations change: the cost of silence becomes higher than the cost of confrontation.

And at that point, this entire structure—legal and political—could quickly collapse. The phrase “the cessation of hostilities” will mean nothing, and the blockade will become a prelude, an inevitable prelude, to war.

To put it more clearly: What we are witnessing today is not the end of a conflict, but rather its management on a low flame.

A war without fanfare… but one that hasn’t ended.

By Khalil Al-Qadi

https://alkhanadeq.com/post/10741/كعكة-الموت-كيف-تحولت-الكراهية-إلى-سياسة-في-إسرائي

Wednesday, May 6, 2026, 3:17 AM

“The Cake of Death”: How did hatred become policy in Israel?

Ben-Gvir and Israeli Attacks on Civilians

In Israel, the issue is no longer merely a marginal moral lapse or a shocking populist act that deviates from the image of the so-called “modern state” in the eyes of the West. Rather, hatred itself is now managed as public policy, produced, marketed, and exploited. The scene in which Itamar Ben-Gvir celebrated his fiftieth birthday with a cake featuring a gallows was not a controversial protocol detail, but a revealing moment of an entire phase of transformation in the structure of Israeli discourse, where violence is shifting from the battlefield to consciousness, and from a tool to an identity.

In this context, the attack on a nun in Jerusalem, the repeated spitting on churches, and the bombing, demolition, and vandalism of churches in southern Lebanon do not appear to be isolated incidents or isolated acts of individual behavior, but rather a natural extension of this structural shift in consciousness and discourse. When Itamar Ben-Gvir, or those who represent this current, come out to justify these actions as part of “doctrine,” we are not dealing with religiosity, but with... An ideologically driven and distorted reading strips religion of any human dimension. Here, an extremism that doesn’t see humanity at all, nor recognize it as a value, is revealed. Consequently, it cannot be concerned with any talk of “freedom of religion” or “protecting worship.” The problem is no longer the violation of these values, but their fundamental denial, and the transformation of attacks on them into justifiable, even acceptable, behavior within a political and cultural environment that thrives on exclusion and hatred.

From Symbol to Doctrine: When Death Becomes a Festive Decoration

On the surface, the “gallows cake” appears to be a provocative act, open to interpretation as exaggeration or political provocation. But at its core, it is much more than that. It is a visual intensification of an idea that has been cultivated for years: transforming violence from a necessary act into a celebrated value. When the gallows, as a symbol of execution, is used in a celebratory event, the message is not only about Palestinian prisoners, but also about redefining the relationship with the “other” as one based on annihilation.

It is noteworthy that the phrase written on The cake—”Sometimes dreams do come true”—is not just dark irony, but a blatant declaration of the normalization of the death penalty, transforming it from a legal debate into a collective, celebratory desire. Here, the symbol becomes an ideology, and the ideology becomes a political program.

Hatred as a Substitute for Achievement

In a political context plagued by complex crises—unresolved wars, internal divisions, and a diminished capacity to impose realities—the ruling coalition, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, seems to have found in hatred a political substitute for achievement.

When the “image of victory” is absent from the battlefields, it is compensated for by an internal symbol: a noose on a cake, a speech about the death penalty, and escalating incitement. This is not a coincidence, but a compensatory mechanism. A political system incapable of producing marketable achievements resorts to creating internal and external enemies and recharging society with a discourse of fear and hatred.

Within Israel, the number of victims of crime in the Arab community exceeds 100 annually, with a marked rise in youth violence and a collapse in the sense of security. Thus, political and media energy is diverted toward symbolic issues such as the “execution of prisoners,” reflecting a deliberate redirection of public attention.

The Disintegration of Norms: From State to Political Tribe

Criticism emanating from within Israeli society itself, including comparisons to Nazi propaganda figures, reveals the level of concern about this decline. But more important than the criticism is what it reveals—a deeper truth: there is no longer a consensus on a shared value system.

When senior police officers attend such an event and prioritize posing for photos with the minister over performing their duties, we are not witnessing an administrative failure, but rather a disintegration of the very concept of the state. Institutions become instruments of loyalty, professionalism is replaced by sycophancy, and the relationship between authority and society is redefined on the basis of affiliation, not law.

The Normalization of Cruelty: From Exception to Rule

The real danger in this scenario lies not in its shock value, but in its potential for repetition. Human experience shows that violence, when presented as an exception, provokes rejection, but when it is reproduced in everyday contexts—celebrations, Speeches, symbols—it gradually becomes commonplace.

In the Israeli case, there seems to be a clear path toward normalizing cruelty:

- Using the language of genocide in political discourse

- Transforming symbols of death into populist tools of expression

- Shifting the debate from “Should we?” to “When and how?”

This path doesn’t target only Palestinians; it reshapes Israeli society itself by generalizing the logic of exclusion to include everyone who doesn’t belong to this ideological system, whether secular or from different religious currents.

The Economy of Hate: How is the Crisis Being Managed Internally?

In the absence of a clear political horizon, hatred becomes a politically viable resource. It is manufactured through the media, fueled by legislation, and marketed through symbols. Here, the “hangman’s cake” becomes part of a broader economy based on transforming tension into political capital.

This explains the insistence on keeping issues like the execution of prisoners at the forefront, despite their impracticality in the foreseeable future. The goal is not implementation, but rather domestic consumption. It is a policy driven by emotion, not results, and by incitement, not solutions.

What this scenario reveals, in essence, is Israel’s shift from managing the conflict to identifying with it. Violence is no longer a tool for achieving political goals; it has become the goal itself, or at least the language through which politics is conducted.

The “hangman’s cake” is not a marginal incident, but rather a symptom of a phase in which public values are being redefined on the basis of exclusion and hostility. At the same time, it is an indicator of a deeper crisis: a political system that lacks the capacity to produce meaning, resorting instead to producing hatred. In such a context, the question is no longer: Why did this happen? But rather: How far can this path go before it explodes in the faces of its own proponents?

[That is measurable to some extent. The number of countries

Author:

Dr. Mohammed Al-Ayoubi

Palestinian journalist

Bachelor’s degree in Journalism and Media

PhD in Law

mohammedwajeehal@gmail.com

Don’s Substack

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